The fires of change: Kirk, Popper, and the Heraclitean debate by Cooper, Holly
Th
e 
Fir
es
 o
f C
ha
ng
e
57
HOLLY COOPER
THE FIRES OF CHANGE:
KIRK, POPPER, AND THE 
HERACLITEAN DEBATE
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I explore a prominent question of Hericlitean scholarship: how 
is change possible? Karl Popper and G. S. Kirk tackle this same question. Kirk 
asserts that Heraclitus believed that change is present on a macrocosmic level 
and that all change is regulated by the cosmic principle logos. Popper, on the 
other hand, claims Heraclitus believed that change is microcosmic and rejected 
that all change is regulated by logos. I argue for a combination of aspects from 
each of their claims and conclude that change is present both microcosmically 
and macrocosmically and that all change is governed by logos.
INTRODUCTION
A fire was struck between two scholars on October 13, 1958 
during a meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London. In his address 
to the group, Karl Popper—the then-president of the Society and 
one of the most well-known philosophers of the twentieth century—
criticized Geoffrey Kirk—a scholar of Ancient Greek who was small-
time compared to Popper—for his work on Heraclitus.1 This criticism 
ignited a feud comprised by series of heated essays that the men 
composed over the next few years. I will primarily be focusing on two 
of these: Kirk’s “Popper on Science and the Presocratics,” and Popper’s 
“Kirk on Heraclitus, and on Fire as the Cause of Balance.”2 
The debate, for the most part, can be captured within one central 
question that Popper outlines concisely: “How is change possible? How 
can a thing change without losing its identity—in which case it would 
no longer be that thing which has changed?”3 Popper keeps with the 
traditional line of thinking and argues that Heraclitus believed that 
everything is constantly changing: everything is a process rather than 
a “thing.” His thesis, attributed to Heraclitus, is as follows: “there are 
no (unchanging) things; what appears to us as a thing is a process. In 
reality a material thing is like a flame; for a flame seems to be a material 
thing, but it is not: it is a process; it is in flux; matter passes through 
it; it is like a river.”4 It is certainly necessary to note that Popper’s 
emphasis is specifically on the micro; when he refers to a “thing,” he 
means an individual object/process. He considers the macro, the whole 
of the universe, only briefly, and quickly turns away from it again, not 
1 Karl R. Popper, “Back to the Pre-Socratics: The Presidential Address,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958-1959): 1; 15-17; G. S. 
Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with 
a Selection of Texts (London: Cambridge University Press, 1957).
2 G. S. Kirk, “Popper on Science and the Presocratics,” Oxford University 
Press 69, no. 275 (1960): 318-339; Karl R. Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus, 
and on Fire as the Cause of Balance,” Oxford University Press 72, no. 287 
(1963): 386-92.
3 Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 386.
4 Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 386-87.
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giving any credit to the idea of cosmic change.5 Kirk, on the other 
hand, offers the unorthodox claim, which in reality was already being 
argued around one hundred-fifty years prior, that Heraclitus posited 
constant change in the world as a whole, rather than in singular “things.”6 
Like Popper, Kirk does not reject the idea running counter to his—that 
change is present in singularities—but rather gives it far too little credit. 
Here, I explore both sides of this debate; however, ultimately, 
the ideas of both philosophers are correct in their own way, and the 
combination of certain elements from each of their papers offers a more 
comprehensive understanding of what Heraclitus actually taught. The 
correct conjunction of their claims is this: both at the micro-level of 
singular objects and the macro-level of the universe as a whole, and 
everywhere in between, everything is in a constant state of change 
which is governed by the cosmic principle logos.
I. MOTION IN THE WHOLE AND THE 
SINGULAR
The first point to prove is Popper’s idea that motion, or change, 
is present in singular objects. Kirk rejects the permeance of the idea 
of motion in singularities, suggesting that Heraclitus did not insist 
that “all things are a process,” but that the world of objects is more 
ordered than Popper asserts.7 This claim does not make much sense if 
one consults the evidence. For instance, Heraclitus accordingly says in 
F32, “God: day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, fullness/hunger. He 
changes like fire which, when mixed with spices, is named according 
to the savour of each.”8 Regardless of what or who “God” is in this 
fragment, Heraclitus is clearly not only recognizing but emphasizing 
the flux between opposites of particular things. It is not entirely clear 
what he means by “mixed with spices,” but it seems to me that the 
5 Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 388. I will return to this passage in the next 
section.
6 Aryeh Finkelberg, “On Cosmogony and Ecpyrosis in Heraclitus,” The 
American Journal of Philology 119, no. 2 (1998): 195; Kirk, “Popper on 
Science,” 337. Kirk’s argument regarding Heraclitus is nestled underneath 
a larger argument concerning Popper’s theory of scientific intuition, which 
I try my best not to be distracted by. Because of this, however, it is more 
difficult to pinpoint where Kirk’s exact thesis regarding Heraclitus lies in 
his paper—if he even posits an exact thesis at all; for the most part, he 
is just responding to Popper’s criticisms, so I am simply paraphrasing his 
argument here. 
7 Kirk, “Popper on Science,” 338.
8 The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists, trans. Robin 
Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41. All translations 
of fragments in this essay come from Waterfield. Popper later criticizes 
claims such as this one that are attributed to Hippolytus’s Refutation of All 
Heresies (Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 390-91.)
very fact that Heraclitus ascribes a “savour” to each singularity is enough 
to prove that the change contained within “things” is an important 
part of his philosophy. We can further affirm this if we look at F13, 
in which Heraclitus recognizes more singularities: “living and dead, 
sleeping and waking, young and old.”9 Again, there are several instances 
here of singular conditions that are affected by motion and process. 
For example, the processes of waking up and falling asleep affect the 
conditions of being awake or asleep. This importation of process onto 
condition alone is enough to rectify Kirk’s disproportionate claim. 
We must next look to the several fragments which support Kirk’s 
idea that change is present in the unified whole of the universe, not just 
the singular. Let us take two examples together: that the universe is 
“single and common”10 and that “war is common, and strife is justice, 
and that everything happens in accordance with strife and necessity.”11 
It is not difficult to interpret the first example: the universe, in truth, 
is a unified whole; it is “common.” We can see in the second example 
that war is “common” as well; strife is present in the most general sense 
of the universe. It is not only the singularities that are governed in 
accordance with flux, but in fact “everything,” which I take to mean 
every possible combination of things up to the entirety of the universe.
Finally, we must combine these two ideas—that change is present 
both in the micro and the macro. It is now that we arrive at the 
pinnacle of Heraclitean imagery: “‘It is impossible to step twice into 
the same river…It scatters and regathers, comes together and dissolves, 
approaches and departs.’”12 This image, which is truly more like a 
motion picture, captures the essence of the correct combination of 
Kirk and Popper’s claims. The pieces of the river—the singularities, 
the billions of drops of water that make it up—altogether form the 
whole river, but neither the individual part nor the complete whole is 
constant. The drops all move and change, but because of this, the river 
as a macrocosm in its entirety is never exactly the same. Taken this 
way, the moving image of the river is unable to fully support, in their 
indignation, either Popper or Kirk’s argument. 
Popper, on one hand, has an interpretation of the river that differs 
from the one given above. He claims that “the rivers are concrete 
rivers,” which symbolize concrete singularities, including people.13 This 
is indeed strange: Popper is giving microcosmic qualities to the river. 
He even imposes plurality onto the rivers; there are several of them, so 
therefore the river, to him, cannot represent a unified whole. But this 
seems counter-intuitive for his argument. How can singular things be 
9 The First Philosophers, 39.
10 The First Philosophers, 38.
11 The First Philosophers, 40.
12 The First Philosophers, 41.
13 Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 388.
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in motion if the river symbolically ascribes concreteness to them? How 
can Popper make a claim so absurd as to say that humans and rivers are 
concrete? It seems that if Popper really meant to preserve the fluidity of 
singularities, then he would have picked a word better than “concrete,” 
so what meaning can he really expect us to see here? I hold this against 
him: the image of a “concrete river” is truly oxymoronic.
Kirk, on the other hand, briefly implies a different interpretation: 
that the river as a whole remains the same river while only its parts 
change.14 Both men favor the phrase “same river” but in two different 
senses: Popper, because the rivers are “concrete,” and Kirk, because he 
means to highlight not the concreteness of the river but the opposite. 
To Kirk, the river is in motion, but there is some other form of stability 
aside from concreteness that pervades it.
II. MEASURE, LAW, AND LOGOS
This other form of stability is the subject of our next discussion. In 
things both singular and general, there is some aspect of the constancy of 
motion, not just the presence of it. That constancy, though, does not 
arise from things in virtue of themselves. Instead, it arises from what 
Waterfield translates as “the principle” in the Heraclitean fragments. It 
is logos—the ultimate voice of cosmic law and measurement. This is the 
subject in which Kirk is right and Popper is partly wrong. 
Kirk attributes to Heraclitus the belief that all things, although 
in motion, maintain an equilibrium which is guaranteed by logos. 
Change is present both singularly and universally, but logos naturally 
regulates this change in order to preserve general stability.15 Popper 
rejects this: while he does say that things appear stable, so the processes 
behind them must be measured and lawlike, he vehemently denies 
that all changes are stable and that logos is common between all things. 
Essentially, he rejects that Heraclitus believed any of the following: 
(a) that all changes are regulated as opposed to only certain ones; (b) 
that fire is the cause of regulation; and (c) that fire is synonymous 
with logos.16 Popper claims that he is completely unable to find even 
a trace of the doctrines that he rejects in the fragments or any other 
ancient sources.17 Quite frankly, he has not looked hard enough. These 
elements that Popper deems “absurd” are all important components 
of Kirk’s correct argument that, according to Heraclitus, constancy in 
motion is a characteristic of all things and that this is made possible by 
overarching logos.
14  Kirk, “Popper on Science,” 338.
15  Kirk, “Popper on Science,” 338.
16  Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 390.
17  Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 390.
I would like to begin with a consideration of (c)—that fire is 
synonymous with logos. Heraclitus outlines in one fragment the 
“turning-points of fire.” Fire turns to sea (which is half earth and half 
lightning), and then sea returns to “the same principle [logos] as before 
it became earth.”18 The starting point here is fire, so if sea must return 
to the starting point of the cycle before it became earth, and what it is 
returning to is logos, then Heraclitus must equate fire with logos. From 
this, we have proven (c) to be true.
We must next prove (a), that all changes are regulated as opposed to 
only certain ones. It will be easiest to do this by first providing evidence 
for balance in microcosms and then providing evidence for balance  
in macrocosms. 
According to one fragment, “[t]he sun, according to Heraclitus, 
is new each day.”19 Heraclitus also says, “The sun will not overstep its 
measures.”20 Even Popper admits, correctly, that it can be seen from 
the first fragment that Heraclitus regarded the sun as a singularity.21 
From the second, we see that the sun—a singularity, a microcosm—
must necessarily stay within the bounds of measure, proving that 
microcosmic motion, according to Heraclitus, is regulated. 
So now we turn to the macro. Heraclitus says that “the principle 
[logos] is common.”22 We saw earlier that Heraclitus believed the universe 
to be a unified whole—to be common—and now we are seeing that 
logos, too, is common. The connection between logos and universal 
oneness is undeniable, especially if we supplement this fragment with 
another: “[i]t is also law to follow the plan of the one.”23 The “law” can 
be taken to be logos, while the “one” can be taken to be the macrocosmic 
universe. Logos pervades throughout the whole of existence. 
Finally, I turn to (b), that fire is the cause of regulation. Heraclitus 
claims that order cannot be attributed to any god or man, but that it 
instead “always was and is and shall be an ever-living fire, flaring up 
in regular measures and dying down in regular measures.”24 Clearly, 
measure and regularity here are attributed to fire, which, as we have 
seen, is equated with logos. This fragment is enough evidence to prove 
that Heraclitus believed (b)—that fire/logos is the cause of  
universal equilibrium. 
It is unclear why Heraclitus held the beliefs that he did regarding 
motion and regulation, as we have seen. Due to the fragmentary nature 
18  The First Philosophers, 42.
19  The First Philosophers, 43.
20  The First Philosophers, 43.
21  Popper, “Kirk on Heraclitus,” 387-88.
22  The First Philosophers, 38.
23  The First Philosophers, 45.
24  The First Philosophers, 41-42.
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of the Heraclitean works that the philosophical world has access to, it 
is easy to speculate about what Heraclitus meant, especially regarding 
the logos that we have just discussed. Several unanswered questions still 
remain about this subject, even after hundreds of years of scholarship. 
For example, why would Heraclitus believe fire to be logos when water 
seems to work just as well for his purposes, especially since his image 
of the river seems to serve basically the same purpose as any image of 
fire that he sets forth? Through what physical or metaphysical means 
did Heraclitus believe his conception of logos to regulate the universe? 
And in regard to the two philosophers that we have been focusing on, 
why would Popper choose to attack Kirk over ideas that seem to be 
obviously present in the Heraclitean fragments? When one attempts to 
answer these questions, the fragments must be carefully examined, and 
the examiner must fit them together like pieces of a puzzle. However, 
as we now know, it is easy for philosophers to force puzzle pieces into 
place when answering these questions instead of thoughtfully  
placing them.
CONCLUSION
These questions are important, but the fundamental question 
remains the same: “How is change possible?” We have seen that 
both Popper and Kirk’s responses to this are correct in some ways 
and defective in others. The attitudes of both men in their papers are 
seething; they are riddled with indignation. It may be for this reason 
that they seem, at times, to posit claims that are not fully coherent with 
their general arguments and even sometimes go as far as contradicting 
themselves. They have fallen victim to the very thing Socrates warned 
against when he said to Gorgias, “So I’m afraid to refute you, lest you 
suppose that I speak from love of victory, not in regard to the subject’s 
becoming manifest, but in regard to you.”25 If only these two men had 
been able to put aside petty differences, they might have been able to 
engage in a dialogue that would have done the philosophical community 
a world of good by pushing us ever closer to the true understanding of 
what Heraclitus did, in fact, believe. Instead, they only divided the two 
schools of thought even more. However, as we have seen, Popper is 
correct on microcosms, Kirk is correct on macrocosms, and only Kirk 
is correct regarding motion. By expanding on elements from Popper’s 
highly traditional view and Kirk’s largely controversial view, a conception 
of Hericlitean thought has been formulated that I believe is more 
accurate than either of theirs taken individually—that both the macro 
and the micro are everchanging, but that this motion is kept in check by 
the universal governing principle logos.
25 Plato, Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 39-40.
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